Transparency reports from global digital platforms show how often and how much the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan have requested user data or the removal of content from social media companies.

We have gathered data from the transparency reports of Meta, TikTok, Google, Apple, and Yandex for the years 2020 to 2024. This data covers various aspects, including content and user blocking, requests for user and account information, internet shutdowns, anti-government and pro-government media campaigns, and demands from the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor or RKN).

Note: Social media platforms release two semi-annual reports each year. The data presented in this article is calculated on an annual basis, and the percentages represent the actual weights derived from the semi-annual data. As a result, they may differ from the semi-annual data available in the sources.

TikTok

TikTok provides several transparency report subtypes highlighting data on the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan over the past five years.

Covert Influence Operations

We have gathered data on hidden influence activities that the platform successfully prevented, ensuring transparency and integrity.

In July 2024, the platform reported that it had discovered a series of covert operations operating in Azerbaijan and targeting Azerbaijani audiences. The individuals behind the network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify favorable narratives about the current Azerbaijani administration. Members of the network were typically found to use images of the Azerbaijani state coat of arms as account profile pictures. The platform blocked 51 accounts with a total of 31,090 followers following this discovery.

A few months later, in October 2024, the platform uncovered another series of internal covert operations, this time in Armenia, targeting the Armenian audience. In this case, too, the individuals behind the network created inauthentic accounts to artificially amplify narratives critical of the current administration. In the report, the platform highlights that the network was found often to use images of Garegin Nzhdeh as account avatars. As a result of this finding, the platform blocked 132 accounts with a total of 88,667 followers.

Government Removal Requests Report

TikTok’s transparency reports show how governments respond to requests to remove or restrict content. The company says it evaluates such requests based on its community guidelines and local (requesting country) laws. If the content violates the laws of a given country, TikTok may restrict its availability only in that country. Requests that lack a legal basis or do not violate the platform’s rules are declined.

TikTok’s transparency data reveals that in recent years, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have consistently approached the platform with requests to remove content or restrict accounts.

In 2023, the Armenian government submitted 10 requests involving one piece of content and eight user accounts, achieving a 100% satisfaction rate. In 2024, the number of requests rose to 21, encompassing 45 pieces of content, of which 42 were removed for violating the platform’s rules. The overall removal rate was 90.8%, indicating that TikTok generally fulfils Armenia’s requests when they comply with both the law and the platform’s internal guidelines.

Azerbaijan had the highest number of content removal requests. In 2023, there were 50 government requests involving approximately 196 pieces of content and 63 accounts, resulting in an 83.4% removal rate. However, in 2024, the number of requests surged to 131, leading to the removal of 430 pieces of content and the suspension of 445 accounts.

Of the total content removed, 229 posts were taken down for violating platform rules, while 66 were removed under Azerbaijan’s internal legislation. Among the accounts, 248 were suspended for breaching platform rules, and 69 were removed under the country’s internal laws. Overall, the removal rate for the year was around 70%.

Over the past five years, Armenia has submitted 35 requests to TikTok, listing 54 pieces of content and 48 user accounts. In contrast, Azerbaijan has submitted 205 requests, which included 809 pieces of content and 600 user accounts.

Thus, Azerbaijan submitted requests at a rate four times higher than Armenia, mentioning content 15 times more frequently and identifying 13 times more accounts. TikTok rejected 203 requests for Azerbaijani content, compared to just 3 for Armenian content. Regarding user accounts, 163 requests from Azerbaijan were dismissed, whereas only 3 from Armenia.

Information Requests Report

TikTok’s Information Requests Report reveals that the platform frequently receives requests from governments and law enforcement agencies to disclose, preserve, or remove user data and content. The company states that it only complies with these requests when there is a legal basis for them or when they pose an imminent threat to human life or safety. The report also emphasises TikTok’s commitment to balancing government requests with user privacy protections while maintaining transparency and compliance with the law.

Government requests for TikTok user data highlight a notable contrast between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Armenia had not made any data requests until 2022, whereas Azerbaijan submitted only one request during the same timeframe. In 2023, there was a slight increase in data preservation requests from both countries. In 2024, Armenia submitted 13 requests, all of which were for data preservation. These requests came from law enforcement or government bodies asking a platform to temporarily store user data without transferring it until a subsequent legal step, such as obtaining a court order, is completed. This trend indicates that over the past two years, Armenia has begun to utilize legal tools more systematically to preserve digital evidence and request data for law enforcement purposes.

In the same year, Azerbaijan submitted 27 data requests. Out of these, 7 were legal requests involving 13 accounts, 19 were emergency requests involving 20 accounts, and 1 was a data retention request. The platform responded positively to only about 21% of the emergency requests; the rest were dismissed. This indicates that a significant portion of the requests from Azerbaijan lacked proper documentation and justification, which is why the platform declined to provide the requested data.